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From Ratner to Qui Tam: Truth-in-
Lending Class Action Developments
By L. RICHARD FISCHER*
ATTEMPTS to utilize the consumer class action to recover the
minimum statutory penalty provided in the Truth-in-Lending Act have
threatened creditors subject to the act with potential liability of stagger-
ing proportions. The very magnitude of this potential liability, how-
ever, may have the anomalous result of neutralizing the class action de-
vice as a deterrent to violations of the act. This article will examine the
purposes of the civil remedy provisions of the act and will review recent
judicial responses to truth-in-lending class actions. Finally, the article
will recommend legislative modification of the act to avoid the practi-
cal problems presented by the use of consumer class actions to enforce
its provisions, and, at the same time, to provide a realistic method of
encouraging private enforcement of truth-in-lending.
Civil Remedies
Perhaps in recognition of common law.failures to provide realistic
private remedies,1 it is increasingly common for modem remedial legis-
lation to contain provisions encouraging private attorneys general by
including an opportunity to obtain recoveries above and beyond com-
pensatory damages.2 While the specific provisions of these statutes
* A.B., 1965, University of San Francisco; J.D., 1970, Hastings College of the
Law.
1. Rice, Remedies, Enforcement Procedures and the Duality of Consumer Trans-
action Problems, 48 B.U.L. REv. 559, 569-70 (1968) [hereinafter cited as Rice, Reme-
dies].
2. E.g., section 4 of the Clayton Act provides: "Any person who shall be in-
jured in his business or property by reason of anything forbidden in the antitrust laws
may sue therefor ... and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained, and
the cost of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee." 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970); the
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 includes the following provision: "Any employer
who violates the provisions . . . of this title shall be liable to the employee or em-
ployees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid over-
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may vary considerably, the principal inducements offered usually fall
within three categories: attorney's fees, minimum damages and multi-
ple damages.' The twofold purpose for the inclusion of such induce-
ments is to compensate the injured party and to deter violations of the
statute in which the inducements are included.4
Drafters of recent remedial legislation have recognized the neces-
sity of providing in such legislation sufficient private or public remedies
to encourage compliance. 5 More specifically, it has become apparent
that legislatures must either rely on governmental agencies or authori-
ties to provide public enforcement or develop a sufficient "incentive-to-
sue element" to make the legislation "self-enforcing." 6  In each case
time compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated
damages. . . . The court in such action shall, in addition to any judgment awarded to
the plaintiff or plaintiffs, allow a reasonable attorney's fee to be paid by the defendant,
and costs of the action." 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970); the Civil Rights Act of 1964
provides in part: "In any action commenced pursuant to this subchapter, the court, in
its discretion, may allow the prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable
attorney's fee as part of the costs, and the United States shall be liable for costs
the same as a private person." 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-3(b) (1970).
Similarly, the civil remedies provision of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code is as
follows:
"(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section, a creditor who, in violation of
the provisions [of the Federal Truth-in-Lending Act], fails to disclose information to a
person entitled to the information under this Act is liable to that person in an amount
equal to the sum of
"(a) twice the amount of the finance charge in connection with the transaction, but
the liability pursuant to this paragraph shall be not less than $100 or more than $1,000;
and
"(b) in the case of a successful action to enforce the liability under paragraph (a),
the costs of the action together with reasonable attorney's fees as determined by the
Court." UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDIT CODE § 5.203. See also NATIONAL CONSUMER
ACT §§ 5.304 (punitive damages), 5.307(1) (attorney's fees).
3. See generally Rice, Remedies, supra note 1, at 567-76.
4. See Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Works v. City of Atlanta, 203 U.S. 390
(1906); Loevinger, Private Action-the Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, 3 ANTITRUST
BULL. 167, 168 (1958) (repair the injury to competitors, provide more effective deter-
rent to antitrust violation); Still, Monetary Recovery Under the Fair Labor Standards
Act, 45 TEXAS L. REV. 921, 948 (1967) (inducements intended to implement private en-
forcement of public compliance with the act); Watkins, Monetary Recovery Under
Federal Antitrust Statutes, 45 TEXAS L. REV. 856 (1967) (remedy intended to compen-
sate the injured party and to deter antitrust violations).
5. Cf. Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc., 390 U.S. 400, 401 (1968).
6. See Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate
Comm. on Banking and Currency, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., at 18 (1967); Rice, Exemplary
Damages in Private Consumer Actions, 55 IOWA L. REV. 307, 327-28 (1969) [herein-
after cited as Rice, Exemplary Damages]. In the area of civil rights, for example,
Congress expected enforcement to be effected primarily through private litigation in
the district courts by plaintiffs' attorneys acting as private attorneys general. Macey,
Award of Attorney Fees as a Stimulant to Private Litigation Under the Truth-in-Lending
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where specific inducements have been provided by statute, the decision
apparently has been made that private individuals ought to be a pri-
mary factor in encouraging compliance with the statute and that such
inducements are necessary to promote such private litigant involve-
ment.7
In enacting the Truth-in-Lending Act,' Congress established two
vehicles for public enforcement. In addition to providing criminal lia-
bility for certain violators,9 Congress distributed administrative enforce-
ment authority among several federal agencies having general supervi-
sory power over certain designated creditors.'" Nevertheless, private
litigation was intended to be a "primary mechanism for inducing com-
pliance with truth-in-lending.""l The specific civil remedy supplied by
Congress for the private enforcement of the act 2 includes all three
principal inducements: multiple damages of twice the amount of the
finance charge in connection with the transaction, 3 minimum damages
of $100,'1 and reasonable attorney's fees as determined by the court.'5
In providing these inducements, the intention of the draftsmen was
clearly to make the Act self-enforcing through private actions.' 6 To
encourage private actions, a "bounty," in the form of the minimum
$100 recovery, is provided to any "affected person' who discovers a
Act, 27 Bus. LAw 593, 596-97 (1972). See Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, Inc.,
390 U.S. 400, 401 (1968) (a Title II suit is private in form only).
7. See Rice, Exemplary Damages, supra note 6, at 338.
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-81t (1970). The Truth-in-Lending Act is a legislative
attempt by Congress to inform consumers of the costs of credit. The specific congres-
sional findings and declaration of purpose are set forth in section 1601 which provides:
"The Congress finds that economic stabilization would be enhanced and the competi-
tion among the various financial institutions and other firms engaged in the extension of
consumer credit would be strengthened by the informed use of credit. The informed use
of credit results from an awareness of the cost thereof by consumers. It is the purpose
of this subehapter to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the consumer
will be able to compare more readily the various credit terms available to him and
avoid the uninformed use of credit." For a brief but good description of the purposes
of the Truth-in-Lending Act see Kroll v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 352 F. Supp. 357, 360
(N.D. IlL 1972).
9. 15 U.S.C. § 1611 (1970).
10. Id. § 1607.
11. Dole, Private Enforcement of Consumer Credit Legislation, 26 Bus. LAW.
915, 920 (1971) (footnote omitted).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1970).
13. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(1) (1970)-
14. Id.
15. Id. § 1640(a) (2).
16. Rice, Remedies, supra note 1, at 575.
17- Section 1640 provides in part that "any creditor who fails . to disclose to
any person any information required ... to be disclosed to that person is liable to that
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violation of the act and successfully prosecutes an action against the
responsible creditor.1 8 The minimum statutory amount may be re-
covered by such an affected person regardless of whether that individ-
ual has himself suffered any actual damages as a result of the viola-
tion.' 9 In discussing this civil penalty, Judge Frankel explained that
the scheme of the statute was to create a species of private attorney
general to participate prominently in the enforcement of the act.
20
Thus, Congress invited individuals, whether they themselves were de-
ceived, to bring suit on the public's behalf. Congress encouraged this
private litigant involvement by providing for the recovery of costs and
a reasonable attorney's fee, in addition to the incentive of public ser-
vice and the $100 minimum statutory award. 2
The justification for such inducements in a truth-in-lending con-
text is obvious. In a typical case involving a violation of the act, indi-
vidual damages are likely to be quite small, if not nonexistent.2 2  The
inducements are intended, therefore, to provide an incentive to consum-
ers to initiate reparative proceedings. 23  In establishing these induce-
ments, Congress not only provided a means whereby an injured party
might be compensated, but also created a sufficient threat of private
suit to serve as a viable deterrent to violations of the act. 24 Neverthe-
less, the inclusion of these inducements has given rise to several prob-
lems, the most pressing of which is the possible application of the civil
penalty provision in a class action context.
Class Action Developments
The class action is by no means a new phenomenon. Class or
representative actions developed in England in the courts of equity at
person .... .." 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) (1970) (emphasis added). Thus, to recover
under this section, an individual must be entitled to certain disclosures and there must be
a failure to provide such disclosures to that individual. See Bostwick v. Cohen, 319
F. Supp. 875, 878 (N.D. Ohio 1970) ("aggrieved debtor").
18. See Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270, 280-81
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
19. Id. at 280.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 280-81 (footnote omitted). See also Wilcox v. Commerce Bank, 55
F.R.D. 134, 135 (D. Kan. 1972), af'd, Civil No. 72-1494 (10th Cir., Feb. 20, 1973).
22. See, e.g., Kroll v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 352 F. Supp. 357, 361 (N.D. Ill. 1972);
Eovaldi v. First Nat'l Bank, 57 F.R.D. 545, 548 (N.D. Ill 1972); Ratner v. Chemical
Bank New York Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
23. See Shields v. First Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 442, 446 (D. Ariz. 1972); Boggs
v. Alto Trailer Sales, Inc., Civil No. 71-1271 (E.D. La., Aug. 8, 1972).
24. See Alsup v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 57 F.R.D. 89, 93 (N.D. Cal. 1972);
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least as early as 1676.25 However, with the large classes made possible
by the "opt out" provision of revised rule 23 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 26 the number of complaints seeking class action treat-
ment under the revised version of the rule has increased substantially.2
Shields v. First Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 442, 447-48 (D. Ariz. 1972); Wilcox v. Com-
merce Bank, 55 F.R.D. 134, 138 (D. Kan. 1972), afrd, Civil No. 72-1494 (10th Cir.,
Feb. 20, 1973).
25. Brown v. Vermuden, 22 Eng. Rep. 796, 797 (Ch. 1676).
26. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2). Subsection (c)(2) is described as an "opt out"
provision because it requires a class member to specifically request to be excluded from
the class. All class members who do not request exclusion are included in the judg-
ment.
27. See generally Foreword to AMEmCAN COLLEGE OF TRIAL LAWYERS, REPORT
AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON RULE 23 OF THE FEDERAL
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE at 11-Il (1972). Presently, revised rule 23 provides in
part:
"(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may sue
or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class is so numerous
that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are questions of law or fact
common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of the representative parties are typical
of the claims or defenses of the class, and (4) the representative parties will fairly and
adequately protect the interests of the class.
"(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class action
if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
"(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of the
class would create a risk of
"(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members of
the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the party op-
posing the class; or
"(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which would as
a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other members not parties to the
adjudications or substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests;
or
"(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds generally
applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunctive relief or .correspond-
ing declaratory relief with respect to the class as a whole; or
"(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members of
the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, and that a
class action is superior to other available methods for the fair and efficient adjudication
of the controversy. The matters pertinent to the findings include: (A) the interest
of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of sepa-
rate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy al-
ready commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or undesir-
ability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the dif-
ficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
"(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to be Maintained; Notice; Judg-
ment; Actions Conducted Partially as Class Actions.
"(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought as a class
action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so maintained. An or-
der under this subdivision may be conditional, and may be altered or amended before
the decision on the merits.
March 19731 TRUTH--IN-LENDING
In particular, considerable interest has developed in the utilization of
the class action vehicle to recover the minimum statutory penalty pro-
vided in the Truth-in-Lending Act.18  Yet, unlike the National Con-
sumer Act 29 or the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938,30 the Truth-in-
Lending Act does not specifically authorize the use of class actions to
enforce its civil remedy provisions.3 " Similarly, its legislative history is
silent on the question of class actions.3 2  Thus, while legislation has
been proposed which will modify the act to provide specifically for
class action recoveries, 33 its present language does not resolve current
questions regarding the appropriateness of maintaining class action suits
to enforce its civil remedy provisions.
Despite this silence, class actions have been brought to remedy a
wide variety of truth-in-lending violations. 3' Perhaps due in part to the
legislative silence regarding the use of the class action vehicle in a truth-
in-lending setting, the defendants in several of these actions have ar-
gued that the maintenance of a truth-in-lending class action is per se
improper.3 5 One defendant urged, for example, that since the legisla-
"(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b) (3), the court shall
direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the circumstances,
including individual notice to all members who can be identified through reasonable ef-
fort. The notice shall advise each member that (A) the court will exclude him from
the class if he so requests by a specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or
not, will include all members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member
who does not request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his
counsel."
28. BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, ANNUAL REPORT
TO CONGRESS ON TRUTH IN LENDING FOR THE YEAR 1972 7, 13-14 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as FRB 1972 REPORT].
29. NATIONAL CONSUMER AcT § 5.308.
30. 29 U.S.C. § 216(b) (1970).
31. Hausmann, Class Actions Under the Truth-in-Lending Act, 1 CLASS ACTION
REP. 26, 30 (1972). See 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1970); Rogers v. Cobum Fin. Corp., 53
F.R.D. 182, 183 n.1, vacated, Civil No. 14843 (Dec. 1, 1971), reinstated, 54 F.R.D. 417
(N.D. Ga. 1972).
32. Wilcox v. Commerce Bank, Civil No. 72-1494, n.21 (10th Cir., Feb. 20, 1973).
33. S. 914, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 208 (1973).
34. E.g., Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270
(S.D.N.Y. 1971) (failure to disclose corresponding nominal annual percentage rate);
Wilcox v. Commerce Bank, 55 F.R.D. 134, 135 (D. Kan. 1972), aff'd, Civil No. 72-
1494 (10th Cir., Feb. 20, 1973) (failure to disclose certain finance charges); Rogers v.
Coburn Fin. Corp., 54 F.R.D. 417, 418 (N.D. Ga. 1972) (failure to include notary fee
in computation of finance charge); Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 53 F.R.D. 539, 540
(W.D. Pa. 1971) (failure to disclose membership fee).
35. E.g., Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y.
1972); Berkman v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GuIDE 99,
270 (N.D. II., June 25, 1971); Martin v. Family Publications Serv. Inc., 4 CCH CON-
SUMER CREDIT GUIDE 1 99,267 (D. Vt., June 30, 1970).
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ive history of the act did not indicate that Congress had considered the
impact of rule 23 in an action to enforce the act, truth-in-lending class
actions were improper.3 6 Without elaboration, the court concluded
that "a class action is an available remedy under the Act. 31 7  In an-
other action, the defendant reasoned that having provided both the in-
centive of a civil penalty and the basis for the recovery of attorney's
fees and costs, Congress had obviated the need for the class action en-
forcement vehicle.3" Nevertheless, the court ordered the suit to pro-
ceed as a class action, specifically stating that the availability of the
class action vehicle was important to the act's enforcement scheme.3 9
In a third action, the defendant argued that the intent of the act was
inconsistent with the maintenance of a class action for the recovery of
statutory minimum penalties and that the allowance of attorney's fees
eliminates the necessity of a class action. 40  While the court ultimately
decided not to certify the class,41 it specifically declined to rule on the
per se improper argument raised by the defendant.42
On the other hand, dictum in a recent decision of the United States
District Court for the Northern District of California provides perhaps
the strongest federal judicial support for the per se improper argument.
In its opinion, the court reasoned that the incentive of class action bene-
fits was unnecessary because Congress has encouraged consumers to
enforce the act through individual efforts.43 Nevertheless, while several
courts have specifically declined to certify particular truth-in-lending
suits as class actions because such suits failed to satisfy certain of the
requirements of rule 23,1" apparently no decision has held class actions
to be per se improper under the act. A case by case examination is,
therefore, necessary to determine whether a particular suit may prop-
erly be maintained as a class action under rule 23.45
36. Berkman v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 4 CC CONSUMER CREDrr GUIDE
99,270 (N.D. III., June 25, 1971).
37. Id.
38. Martin v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 4 CCH CoNsuMER CnRErr Gum
1 99,267 (D. Vt., June 30, 1970).
39. Id.
40. Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412, 416 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
41. Id.
42. Id. at 413.
43. Alsup v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 57 F.R.D. 89, 93 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
44. See Wilcox v. Commerce Bank, Civil No. 72-1494, opinion at 13-15, 25-26
(10th Cir., Feb. 20, 1973); Rogers v. Coburn Fin. Corp., 53 F.R.D. 182, 183 n.1, vacated,
Civil No. 14843 (Dec. 1, 1971), reinstated, 54 F.R.D. 417 (N.D. Ga. 1972). See
also FRB 1972 REPoRT, supra note 28, at 21-22 n.13.
45. See Rogers v. Cobum Fin. Corp., 53 F.R.D. 182, 183 n.1, vacated Civil No.
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Rule 23(a)
While earlier decisions in truth-in-lending suits provide little in-
sight into the factors considered by the courts in ruling upon the appro-
priateness of maintaining the suits as class actions, 6 the expanded dis-
cussion presented in more recent decisions makes possible a closer ex-
amination of the application of rule 23 to truth-in-lending actions."7
As a threshold matter, it is clear that a truth-in-lending class action can-
not be properly maintained under rule 23 unless the class is so nu-
merous as to make joinder of all members impracticable, there exist
questions of law or fact common to the class, the claims of the
representative parties are typical of the claims of the class, and the
representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the interests
of the class.4  In most truth-in-lending actions against creditors
who provide standard form disclosure statements to consumers, the
plaintiff 9 should have little difficulty in establishing the impracticabil-
ity of the joinder of all members of the purported class or the existence
of common questions of law or fact. 50 Difficulty may be encountered,
however, in establishing the typicality of the claims of the representa-
tive party or the ability of the representative party to fairly and ade-
quately represent the purported class. Thus, the question may arise
whether an individual plaintiff may represent those who have received
credit cards or extensions of credit from, or have dealt with, creditors
14843 (Dec. 1, 1971), reinstated, 54 F.R.D. 417 (N.D. Ga. 1972). Cf. Goldman v.
First Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 587 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
46. See, e.g., Berkman v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT
GUIDE 99,270 (N.D. Ill., June 25, 1971); Richardson v. Time Premium Co., 4 CCH
CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE 99,273 (S.D. Fla., Feb. 4, 1971); Mourning v. Family
Publications Serv., Inc., 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE g 99,632 (S.D. Fla., Nov.
27, 1970).
47. E.g., Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank, 56 F.RD. 587 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Ratner v.
Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
48. FED. R. CIv. P. 23(a). See footnote 27 supra.
49. The plaintiff has the burden of establishing the appropriateness of class action
treatment. Johnson v. Austin Furniture, Inc., Civil No. 72 C 724 (N.D. Ill., Oct. 11,
1972); Cusick v. N.V. Nederlandesche Combinatie Voor Chemische Industrie, 317 F.
Supp. 1022, 1025 (E.D. Pa. 1970); Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Anaconda Am. Brass Co.,
43 F.R.D. 452, 457 (E.D. Pa. 1968); 3B J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE, 23.02 at
23-152 to 23-153 (2d ed. 1969). A purported class action may not proceed as such un-
til the court enters an order based on findings of fact that the action meets the four
prerequisites of rule 23(a) and satisfies one of the three subdivisions of rule 23(b).
See id. at 23.50 at 23-101. Cf. Wilcox v. Commerce Bank, 55 F.R.D. 134, 135 (D.
Kan. 1972), aff'd, Civil No. 72-1494 (10th Cir., Feb. 20, 1973).
50. See, e.g., Haynes v. Logan Furniture Mart, Inc., Civil No. 70 C 1827 (N.D.
Ill., Sept. 20, 1972); Kriger v. European Health Spa, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 104 (E.D. Wis.
1972); Buford v. American Fin. Co., 333 F. Supp. 1243 (N.D. Ga. 1971).
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with whom the representative party has had no relationship whatso-
ever." For example, certain of the defendants in one truth-in-lending
action argued that the plaintiff had not satisfied the requirements of
typicality and adequate representation with respect to them because the
plaintiff had borrowed from a completely unrelated defendant credi-
tor. -5 2  The argument continued that since a representative plaintiff may
represent only his class, the plaintiff in the action could not represent
persons who borrowed from other creditors. 53 Despite these arguments
of the nonrelated defendants, the court determined the class action to
be proper with respect to all of the defendants. 54
Similarly, a plaintiff may be disqualified as a representative of a
purported class as the result of his actions. In one truth-in-lending ac-
tion, the plaintiff first exercised her right to rescind the transaction55
51. LaMar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 55 F.R.D. 22 (D. Ore. 1972).
52. Id. at 24. The only alleged "relationship" between the named defendants was
that each was a pawnbroker that failed to satisfy the disclosure requirements of the
Truth-in-Lending Act. The plaintiff did not argue that the defendants had acted in con-
cert or even that they belonged to a common trade association or similar organization;
in fact, no such common bonds existed.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 24-25. In certifying the class with respect to all of the defendants, the
court stated:
"Plaintiff purports to represent 33,000 borrowers each with an alleged right of ac-
tion against one or more of the defendants. Each defendant allegedly injured all bor-
rowers in the same way: i.e., by failing to follow the requirements of the Truth in
Lending Act. Plaintiff thus seeks to represent persons who have suffered similar in-
juries, and who may therefore be said to have similar 'rights' against the defendants.
"The fact that plaintiff was not, himself, injured by each and every defendant does
not detract from the representative nature of his claim. All members of the purported
class are similarly situated, within the meaning of Rule 23.
"One important function of a class action is to afford meaningful legal rights to
persons who may be ignorant of such rights . . .or to those whose individual claims
are too small to support custom-tailored litigation. [Citation omitted]. If the Rule is to
be effective, the courts should not restrict class membership by narrow and grudging
rules. Unduly restrictive limitations upon the class may have the effect of denying legal
remedies to the ignorant and the poor while creating windfall immunities for law vio-
lators." Id. Supplemental briefs on the multiple defendant question were requested and
have been filed in connection with the appeal of this decision; oral argument is ex-
pected to be set in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in the near future. LaMar v.
H & B Novelty & Loan Co., Civil No. 72-1485 (9th Cir., filed Mar. 16, 1972).
55. The Truth-in-Lending Act provides the conshmer with the right to rescind cer-
tain credit transactions involving real property used or expected to be used as the prin-
cipal residence of the consumer to whom the credit is extended. 15 U.S.C. § 1635
(1970). This section provides in part: "Except as otherwise provided in this section,
in the case of any consumer credit transaction in which a security interest is retained
or acquired in any real property which is used or is expected to be used as the residence
of the person to whom credit is extended, the obligor shall have the right to rescind
March 19731
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and then attempted to recover, for herself and each member of the pur-
ported class, the civil penalty provided in the act.56 The court held
that the plaintiff had elected her remedy and thus was precluded from
obtaining additional relief under the act.5 7  Furthermore, the court
concluded that since the plaintiff did not have a civil remedy against the
defendant, she was not a member of the class of persons she sought to
represent and, thus, could not prosecute an action on behalf of the
class.58
Alternatively, action on the part of the defendant may preclude
the plaintiff from representing the class. In one action, the plaintiff as-
serted a truth-in-lending claim on behalf of himself and all other Din-
ers Club cardholders.59 Subsequent to the institution of the action,
the plaintiff's card was revoked by the defendant company for non-
payment.6 ° The court held that since the plaintiff was no longer a Din-
ers Club cardholder, he was not a member of the class he sought to
represent. 61 The court was quick to point out, however, that the rea-
son for the termination of the plaintiff's membership (his failure to
pay past due charges) occurred prior to the institution of the action and
that the "evidence before the court indicates that the plaintiff's member-
ship was terminated for that reason and for no other reason. 62
Challenges to the ability of a plaintiff to fairly and adequately
represent a class in a truth-in-lending action may center on the compe-
tence of the plaintiff's counsel or on an alleged conflict between the in-
terests of the named plaintiff and the interests of the members of the
purported class. Applying this principle, one court noted that the ac-
the transaction until midnight of the third business day following the consummation of
the transaction or the delivery of the disclosures required under this section and all
other material disclosures required under this part, whichever is later, by notifying
the creditor, in accordance with regulations of the Board of his intention to do
so. The creditor shall clearly and conspicuously disclose, in accordance with regu-
lations of the Board, to any obligor in a transaction subject to this section the
rights of the obligor under this section. The creditor shall also provide, in accord-
ance with regulations of the Board, an adequate opportunity to the obligor to exercise
his right to rescind any transaction subject to this section." Id. § 1635(a).
56. Bostwick v. Cohen, 319 F. Supp. 875, 876 (N.D. Ohio 1970).
57. Id. at 877.
58. Id. at 878.
59. Syna v. Diners Club, Inc., 49 F.R.D. 119, 120 (S.D. Fla. 1970).
60. Id.
61. Id. at 121.
62. Id. Nevertheless, it might be noted that on the day after plaintiff's member-
ship was terminated the defendant company also credited plaintiff's account for the
amount of the interest charge providing the basis of the plaintiff's complaint. Unilateral
action of this type is a common defense tactic aimed at disqualifying a "representative"
plaintiff under rule 23 (a) (3).
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tions of the attorney seeking to prosecute the case demonstrated his
lack of experience and his lack of understanding of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure as well as the rules of that district court.6 Such a
challenge, however, could result in a court-directed substitution of a
more qualified plaintiff's class action attorney64 a result that may be
difficult for a defense counsel to explain to his client. With respect to
the conflict of interest question, several courts have held that an attor-
ney attempting to represent himself as well as the class is not competent
or objective enough to fairly and adequately protect the interests of the
class. 65 Thus, one court explained that in seeking to represent himself
individually, while at the same time attempting to recover attorney's
fees for his representation of the class, the plaintiff demonstrated that
he was not competent to represent the class.66 In another truth-in-
lending action, the court discussed the plaintiff's association with the
law firm representing him in the action and stated that as a result of
this association the plaintiff could not fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class. 67  Specifically, the court explained that because
the law firm might be required to withdraw as counsel to the class if the
plaintiff was required to give testimony during the course of the action,
the plaintiff had initiated the action under a disability not shared by
other members of the class-namely, "an inability to testify except at
the cost of withdrawal of counsel familiar with the case from its incep-
63. Shields v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 448, 449-50 (D. Ariz. 1972).
64. Cf. Eovaldi v. First Nat'l Bank, 57 F.R.D. 545, 546-47 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
65. Eovaldi v. First Nat'l Bank, 57 F.R.D. 545, 546 (N.D. IlL 1972); Shields v.
Valley Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 448, 449-50 (D. Ariz. 1972); Shields v. First Nat'l Bank,
56 F.R.D. 442, 444 (D. Ariz. 1972). In this regard, the following dictum in Berkman
v. Sinclair Oil Corp. is noteworthy: "Plaintiffs Berkman and Adelman are attorneys.
Some courts have denied class actions based on the impropriety of a plaintiff-attorney's
representation of a class in Truth in Lending cases .... This Court in its opinion
in Goldman did not decide the issue of the impropriety of a plaintiff-attorney purport-
ing to represent the interests of a class, nor will this Court at the present time decide
the issue of propriety. Yet, this Court is not blind to the possible dangers present in
this situation." Civil Nos. 69 C 2055, 69 C 2320 (N.D. Ill., Mar. 8, 1973) opinion
at 14-15. The court then noted: "For a delineation of these dangers see: Class
Action Under the Truth in Lending Act, 87 Notre Dame Lawyer 1305, 1316-17;
Handler, The Shift From Substantive to Procedural Innovation in Anti-Trust Suits-
the Twenty-Third Annual Anti-Trust Review, 71 Colum. L. Rev. 1, 9 (1971)." Opinion
at 15 n. 15.
66. Shields v- Valley Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 448, 449-50 (D. Ariz. 1972). The
court went on to state: "The practice involved does not seem to the Court to comport
with the high quality of objectivity, duty and integrity required of lawyers practicing
in this Court or elsewhere. This case seems to involve a questionable method of solicit-
ing legal business and such solicitation should not be encouraged." Id.
67. Kriger v. European Health Spa, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 104, 105-06 (E.D. Wis.
1972).
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tion."6 s  In response to the plaintiff's argument that his testimony
might not be needed, the court concluded that the mere possibility of
such a need made the plaintiff less capable of adequate representation
than other members of the class.69
Rule 23(b)
Despite the arguments available to defense counsel with respect to
the issues of typicality and adequate representation, courts have de-
termined the requirements of rule 23(a) to have been satisfied in sev-
eral truth-in-lending class actions."0 Nevertheless, in order to be prop-
erly maintained as a class action, a suit must, in addition to satisfying
the four requirements of rule 23 (a), satisfy any one of the three subdi-
visions of rule 23(b). 71
Rule 23(b)(1)
Plaintiffs in several truth-in-lending actions72 have argued for cer-
tification of a class on the basis that the prosecution of separate actions
would create a risk of inconsistent or varying adjudications as to indi-
vidual members of the class, and that such adjudications would estab-
lish incompatible standards of conduct for the opponent of the class. 3
In what appears to be the only truth-in-lending class action in which
the court certified a rule 23 (b) (1) (A) class action ("clause A" class
action), the district court's docket card shows that the defendant sub-
mitted no papers in opposition to the plaintiff's motion.
7 1
68. Id. at 106.
69. Id.
70. E.g., Buford v. American Fin. Co., 333 F. Supp. 1243, 1249 (N.D. Ga. 1971);
LaMar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 55 F.R.D. 22, 25 (D. Ore. 1972); Rogers v .Co-
burn Fin. Corp., 53 F.R.D. 182, 183, vacated, Civil No. 14843 (Dec. 1, 1971), rein-
stated, 54 F.R.D. 417 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 53 F.R.D. 539,
540 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
71. Kenney v. Landis Financial Group, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 939, 951 (N.D. Iowa
1972); Buford v. American Fin. Co., 333 F. Supp. 1243, 1249 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Wil-
cox v. Commerce Bank, 55 F.R.D. 134, 135 (D. Kan. 1972), aff'd, Civil No. 72-1494
(10th Cir., Feb. 20, 1973).
72. E.g., Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 587, 589 (N.D. Il. 1972); Shields
v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 448, 451 (D. Ariz. 1972); Ratner v. Chemical Bank
New York Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412, 414-15 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). For a general discus-
sion of the three subdivisions of rule 23(b), see Amendments to Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure, Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 69 (1966); Note, Rule 23: Categories of
Subsection (b), 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 539 (1969).
73. FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(1)(A). Seenote27 supra.
74. Smith v. International Magazine Serv. of Mid-Atlantic, Inc., 4 CCH CONSUMER
CREDIT GUIDE 99,249 (N.D.W. Va., Oct. 29, 1971).
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On the other hand, several courts have specifically declined to cer-
tify clause A class actions in a truth-in-lending setting. 75 In the most
important of these decisions, the court held that the certification of a
clause A class was not appropriate in an action to establish monetary
liability. 76  In two other truth-in-lending actions, the courts refused to
75. In Shields v. Valley National Bank, the court, in concluding that the proposed
class action did not comply with clause A, observed that the Truth-in-Lending Act
grants all potential class members the same rights they would have collectively as well
as the power to hold defendant to the same standard of conduct. 56 F.R.D at 451.
The court in Goldman v. First National Bank, having reviewed the notes of the advi-
sory committee regarding subdivision (b)(1) of rule 23, explained that in order for
there to be a risk of varying adjudications, there must be different parties attempting to
impose different standards upon an individual. The .court noted that since there was no
suggestion that some plaintiff might sue to compel less disclosure than that provided
by the defendant, there was no danger in that case that the defendant would be con-
fronted with incompatible standards of conduct. Thus, the court held that the plain-
tiff could not maintain a rule 23(b)(1)(A) class in that action. 56 F.R.D. at 590.
The court in Ratner, in denying the maintenance of a class action under clause A, stated
that "there is no suggestion that some perverse plaintiff might sue (though none has) to
compel less disclosure than defendant is now supplying. The prospect of 'varying ad-
judiciations' is in a word imaginary." 54 F.R.D. at 415 (footnote omitted). See also
Rodrigueif v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 57 F.R.D. 189 (C.D. Cal. 1972). It might
be noted, however, that Regulation Z prohibits the presentation with required disclosures
of additional information or explanations "stated, utilized, or placed so as to mislead
or confuse the customer or contradict, obscure, or detract attention from the informa-
tion required. . to be disclosed." 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(c) (Supp. 1972). It is quite
possible, therefore, for some plaintiff to sue to compel less disclosure than that pro-
vided by the defendant.
76. Rodriguez v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 57 F.R.D. 189 (C.D. Cal. 1972).
Specifically, the Rodriguez court explained: "Clause (A), however, does not apply to
an action for a monetary liability. See Note, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Rule
23, The Class Action Device and Its Utilization, 22 U. FLA. L. Rnv. 631, 636 (1970)
('[A]ctions for money damages would not be affected by clause (A) even where the op-
posing party might have to pay some class members but not others.'); Note, Rule 23:
Categories of Subsection (b), 10 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 539, 540 (1969) (Thus,
actions for money damages would not be a clause (A) situation. Although the oppos-
ing party may have to pay some members of the class and not other members, this
kind of incompatible conduct does not fall within the specific concern of (b) (1) (A)2).
Furthermore, plaintiff's concern that courts might reach inconsistent or varying adjudica-
tions as to monetary liability under Section 130(a) is unfounded. If anything, one
would assume that stare decisis would result in uniform decisions." 57 F.R.D. at 192.
The following dictum from Ratner is also helpful in this regard: "Since the obser-
vations in the text seem sufficient for clause (A), the court need not and does not reach
the broader defense argument, supported by scholarly authority, that this provision was
not meant as a vehicle for class claims asserting the kind of monetary liability here in
question. See Travers & Landers, The Consumer Class Action, 18 KAN. L. REv. 811, 823-
24 (1970); Comment, Rule 23: Categories of Subsection (b), 10 B.C. IhD. & CoM. L.
Rav. 539, 540-42 (1968); Note, Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: Rule 23, The Class
Action Device and its Utilization, 22 U. FLA. L. REv. 631, 636 (1970); Note, Proposed
Rule 23: Class Actions Reclassified, 51 VA. L. REv. 629, 646-47 (1965)." 54 F.R.D.
at 415 n.5.
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certify clause A classes because the defendants in the actions appar-
ently were willing to assume the risk of incompatible standards. 77  In
one of the decisions, the court explained that by seeking to have a
clause A class certified, the plaintiff was, in effect, attempting to pro-
tect the defendant from the risk of incompatible standards of conduct
caused by varying or inconsistent adjudications. 7  Nevertheless, be-
cause the defendant apparently was willing to accept this risk, the court
concluded that the certification of a clause A class was not appropri-
ate.79
In another truth-in-lending action, the plaintiff made a stare de-
cisis argument for the certification of a rule 23(b) (1) (B) class
("clause B" class).80 Briefly stated, the argument from stare decisis
to clause B is that the decision rendered in a suit by one member of a
consumer class will be a precedent in subsequent suits brought by other
class members and, as such, will determine or substantially affect the
outcome of the subsequent suits. Thus, the argument continues, be-
cause it is unlikely that another court would reach a decision differing
from the ultimate decision in the first suit, that suit should be main-
tainable as a clause B class action.8 ' The court in this truth-in-lending
action, in rejecting the stare decisis argument and declining to certify a
clause B class, stated that clause B was intended for situations where
the action would be dispositive of the interests of nonparty class mem-
bers "in a practical sense," such as a suit to determine the distribution
of a common fund, and that the clause was not appropriate "simply be-
cause a legal precedent may be established. '8 2  This reasoning has
77. Kenney v. Landis Financial Group, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 939, 951 (N.D. Iowa
1972); Alsup v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 57 F.R.D. 89, 92 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
78. Kenney v. Landis Financial Group, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 939, 951 (N.D. Iowa
1972).
79. Id.
80. Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 587, 591 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
81. See FED R. Civ. P. 23 (b)(1)(B). See note 27 supra. Perhaps a more di-
rect argument to rule 23(b)(1)(B) would be that since it is highly unlikely that an-
other court would reach a decision that differed from that in the first action, the first
action should be maintainable as a clause (B) class action in that the prosecution of sepa-
rate actions would create a risk of actions involving individual class members which,
as a practical matter, would determine the interests of nonparty members of the class
or would substantially impair or impede the ability of such members to protect their in-
terests.
82. Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D 587, 591 (N.D. Ill. 1972). The court
went on to express agreement with the following reasoning of Professors Travers and
Landers for the unacceptability of the stare decisis argument: "For any case to qualify
for class action treatment under 23(a)(2) there must be common questions of law or
fact, and under 23(b)(3) these questions must 'predominate.' Hence, in any case meet-
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been adopted by the courts in two subsequent truth-in-lending ac-
tions.83
Rule 23(b)(2)
In a number of truth-in-lending suits,84 the plaintiffs have sought
to justify the maintenance of a class action on the grounds that injunc-
tive or declaratory relief was appropriate with respect to the whole
class, because the party opposing the class had acted or refused to act
on grounds generally applicable to the class.8 5  The court in one such
suit explained that where the predominant reason for bringing the ac-
tion is the recovery of monetary damages, the plaintiff must look to
subsection (b)(3) rather than subsection (b)(2) to justify class ac-
tion treatment. 86 The court went on to hold that a rule 23(b)(2) class
ing these criteria the first decision will be a precedent. In effect the argument from stare
decision converts virtually all class actions into (b)(1)(B) actions, rendering the other
alternatives under Rules 23 (b) superfluous." Id.
83. Rodriguez v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 57 F.R.D. 189, 192-93 (C.D.
Cal. 1972); Alsup v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 57 F.R.D. 89, 92 (N.D. Cal. 1972). In
Ratner, the plaintiff also sought to maintain a class action under clause B. While
leaving open the question of whether a truth-in-lending class action could ever be main-
tained under clause B, the court stated: "Clause B has even less plausibility for plain-
tiffs purposes. Nothing has happened or can happen in the foreseeable course of this
lawsuit that could be 'dispositive of the interest of other members not parties . . . or
substantially impair or impede their ability to protect their interests. .. ."' 54 F.R.D.
at 415 (footnote omitted). Responding to a similar argument, the court, in Kenney v.
Landis Financial Group, Inc., explained: "So far as clause (B) is concerned the court
finds no interests held by non-party members of the proposed class which would be im-
paired or impeded by this suit not being prosecuted for the class." 349 F. Supp. at 951.
84. E.g., Eovaldi v. First Nat'l Bank, 57 F.R.D. 545, 547 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Alsup
v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 57 F.R.D. 89, 91 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Goldman v. First Nat'l
Bank, 56 F.R.D. 587, 592 (N.D. fI1. 1972).
85. FD. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2). See note 27 supra.
86. Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 587, 592-93 (N.D. Il. 1972). Specifi-
cally, the Goldman court explained: "Rule 23(b)(3) is concerned primarily with
class actions where damages have been demanded. Thus, as a general rule, each member
of a 23(b) (3) [class] has suffered an individual wrong and is entitled to recover indi-
vidual damages. In the instant case, each member of the class would be entitled to
recover a minimum amount of $100 damages if liability is found. Under Rule 23, each
member of a Rule 23(b) (3) class is protected by special notice provisions, a right to opt
out from the class within a reasonable time and a right to enter an individual appearance
through counsel.
"None of the rights given to members of a Rule 23(b) (3) class are given to mem-
bers of a Rule 23(b) (2) class. The reason for this is obvious. An injunction granted
at the request of one or a few members of a class effectively precludes the defendant
from engaging in the enjoined conduct as to others as well. Moreover, active partici-
pation of all class members as parties in an injunction proceeding is unnecessary.
"Accordingly, this Court is of the opinion that where the predominant reason for
instituting a suit is the recovery of damages, as is obviously the case here, a Rule
23(b) (2) class is not appropriate." Id. at 592-93 (citations omitted).
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is not appropriate where substantial money damages have been de-
manded in addition to the requested injunctive relief.8 7
Conversely, if the plaintiff seeks declaratory or injunctive relief with
respect to the continuing conduct of a defendant that allegedly violates
the act, a court could conceivably certify a subdivision (b)(2) class
even though the representative of the class also seeks to recover, on be-
half of himself alone, the minimum statutory penalty and reasonable
attorney's fees and costs as provided in the act.88  Nevertheless, dictum
in one recent action argues against the certification of any subdivision
(b)(2) truth-in-lending class action. The court in that action ex-
plained that by its very content the Truth-in-Lending Act forces a
creditor to a standard of conduct which is applicable to all customers
of that creditor, irrespective of whether they are members of the pro-
posed class.8 9
Rule 23(b)(3)
Subdivision (b)(3) of revised rule 23 is intended to encompass
those situations that previously might have been classified as spurious
class actions.9 0 For a class action to be properly maintained under
87. Id. at 593.
88. See Dole, Private Enforcement of Consumer Credit Legislation, 26 Bus. LAw.
915, 918 (1971); Hausmann, Class Actions Under the Truth-in-Lending Act, 1 CLASS
AcTION REP. 26, 31 (1972).
Nonetheless, in Goldman, the plaintiff first sought to recover the minimum statutory
$100 penalty for each member of the class as well as for himself. Then, "apparently
aware that no court is likely to levy such a crushing judgment on a defendant for a vio-
lation of a very new and technical statute," the plaintiff amended the complaint to speci-
fically disclaim, on behalf of himself and of the class, any prayer for the $100 minimum
damages provided in the Act. 56 F.R.D. at 591-92. The court decided, however, that
the plaintiff was "without power to disclaim rights given to members of the pur-
ported class by statute." Id. at 592. See also Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust
Co., 54 F.R.D. 412, 416 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). In addition, the Goldman court noted
that while the plaintiff could disclaim the statutory minimum amount on behalf of
himself alone, should he do so he would not be a representative of the class since his
interests would then be different from that of the class members. Goldman v. First Nat'l
Bank, 56 F.R.D. 587, 592 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1972). While there is apparently no decision
that specifically discusses the possibility of allowing a plaintiff to bring an action to
recover the statutory minimum amount on behalf of himself and to recover actual dam-
ages on behalf of purported class members, the dictum in footnote 4 of the Goldman
opinion infers that rule 23 (a) (3) would preclude this possibility.
89. Shields v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 448, 451 (D. Ariz. 1972).
90. In discussing rule 23(b)(3), the advisory committee noted that: "In the
situations to which this subdivision relates, class-action treatment is not as clearly
called for as [under subdivisions (b)(1) and (b)(2)], but it may nevertheless be con-
venient and desirable depending upon the particular facts. Subdivision (b) (3) encom-
passes those cases in which a class action would achieve economies of time, effort,
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this subdivision, the plaintiff must establish that the questions common
to the class predominate over questions affecting only individual mem-
bers.91 As the advisory committee on revised rule 23 explained: "It is
only where this predominance exists that economies can be achieved by
means of the class action device."92 The question of the predominance
of common questions in a truth-in-lending context has been considered
by several courts.9 3 In one action, the plaintiff alleged that the dis-
closure statement provided to him and to purported class members by the
defendant violated the act.94 However, because of the lack of predomi-
nance of common questions, the court refused to permit the suit to pro-
ceed as a class action.95 Specifically, the court explained that no econ-
omy would be gained by allowing the suit to proceed as a class action,
since it would still be necessary for the court to examine several thousand
disclosure statements to determine if each complied with the disclosure
requirements imposed by the act. The court feared that the suit would
"rapidly degenerate into multiple lawsuits separately tried, which is
precisely what Rule 23(b)(3) prohibits. 96
Despite the standard forms utilized by major creditors, such as the
periodic monthly disclosure statements provided to open-end credit ac-
counts,9 7 defense attorneys should be able to raise substantial questions
and expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, with-
out sacrificing procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results." Amend-
ments to Rules of Civil Procedure, Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 103
(1966).
91. FED. R. Cv. P. 23(b)(3). See note 27 supra.
92. Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure, Advisory Committee's Note, 39
F.R.D. 69, 102-93 (1966).
93. E.g., LaMar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 55 F.R.D. 22, 25 (D. Ore. 1972);
Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp., 53 F.R.D. 539, 542-43 (W.D. Pa. 1971); Altenbach v.
Francis Ford, Inc., Civil No. 72-963 (D. Ore., Apr. 30, 1973).
94. Rogers v. Coburn Fin. Corp., 53 F.R.D. 182, 183, vacated, Civil No. 14843
(Dec. 1, 1971), reinstated, 54 F.R.D. 417 (N.D. Ga. 1972).
95. Id. at 183.
96. Id. When on rehearing, the plaintiff was able to establish that only two dis-
closure statements were used by the defendant during the period in question and that
both contained the provisions determined by the court to be violative of the Truth-in-
Lending Act, the court agreed that questions of law and fact common to the class did
predominate over any questions affecting only individual members, such as the compu-
tation of individual recoveries. 54 F.R.D. at 418. The court, however, went on to
deny glass action treatment for lack of superiority. Id. at 419.
' 97. The periodic disclosure requirements for open-end credit accounts are set
forth at 15 U.S.C. § 1637(b) (1970). The term "open-end credit" is defined in Reg-
ulation Z. 12 C.F.R. § 226.2(r) (Supp. 1972). Nevertheless, the question whether
a particular extension of credit is open-end or "other than open-end" is at times very
difficult to answer, See 12 C.F.R. § 226,8 (Supp. 1972). Elowever, most credit cLrd
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concerning the predominance of common questions presented in most
truth-in-lending class actions. An argument can be made, for example,
that the distinction between a business cardholder and a consumer
cardholder and, more importantly, between business purchases and
consumer purchases98 would require a detailed examination of every
cardholder's account for every month to determine for each transaction
whether the card was used for personal or business purposesY9 Simi-
larly, counterclaims against the plaintiffs, both named and unnamed,
may make an action unsuitable for class action treatment; such counter-
claims may, for example, result in an adverse decision regarding the
predominance of common questions' or the manageability of the ac-
tion.101
accounts, such as those opened for cardholders in Katz would constitute open-end credit
accounts.
98. The distinction between business purchases and consumer purchases becomes
important in light of the fact that the act's disclosure requirements do not apply to
"credit transactions involving extensions of credit for business or commercial purposes
. 15 U.S.C. § 1603(1) (1970).
99. In the Katz case, the defendant argued that section 104 of the act, 15 U.S.C. §
1603 (1970), would require a detailed examination of every cardholder's account for
every month to determine whether the card was used for personal or business reasons,
and thus, that individual questions predominated over questions applicable to the class
as a whole. The court noted the complexities of questions concerning individual use
raised by section 104 of the act, as well as complexities presented by the size of a class
and questions concerning actual damages, but nevertheless held that the questions of law
and fact did predominate and thus that the action could be maintained as a class ac-
tion. 53 F.R.D. at 542-43. However, the court in Rodriguez expressed the following
contrary view: "The questions of law or fact here common to the members of the class
do not predominate over any questions affecting only individual members. Section 104
of the Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1603 (1970), provides for an exemption for extensions of
credit for business or commercial purposes. That exemption will require an individual
analysis of the circumstances surrounding each customer's contract with defendant to de-
termine if it applies. Counterclaims by defendant for nonpayment of amounts due
under the contracts, which would be compulsory counterclaims under Rule 13(a), would
raise further difficulties, including possible defenses such as the fraud defense
raised in plaintiff's reply to defendant's counterclaim here. Questions affecting only in-
dividual members, therefore, predominate over questions common to the members of the
class." 57 F.R.D. at 193.
100. Rodriguez v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 57 F.R.D. 189, 193 (C.D. Cal.
1972). See also Berkman v. Sinclair Oil Corp., Civil Nos. 69 C 2055, 69 C 2320,
opinion at 13 (N.D. Ill., Mar. 8, 1973).
101. Cotchett v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 549, 553 (S.D.N.Y.
1972); Berkman v. Sinclair Oil Corp., Civil Nos. 69 C 2055, 69 C 2320, opinion at 12
(N.D. Ill., Mar. 8, 1973). In Berkman, the court explained: "Any class action would
involve a number of delinquent credit card holders. Cleraly [sic], defendants have a
plethora of small claims against these delinquent credit card holders which might well
have to be asserted as compulsory counterclaims under the Federal Rules. Such a
result would turn this action into a wholly unmanageable proceeding. Such counter-
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The predominance of common questions is not, however, the sole
requirement for the certification of a rule 23(b)(3) class. 102  To
properly maintain a (b)(3) class action, the plaintiff must also estab-
lish that the class action vehicle is "superior to other available meth-
ods for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy."10 3  The
advisory committee explained that to underscore the importance of an
assessment by the court of the "relative advantages of alternative pro-
cedures for handling the total controversy," rule 23(b)(3) requires as
an additional condition of the certification of a class action that the
court determine the class action device to be "superior" to these alterna-
tive procedures in light of the particular circumstances of the case.' 04
This requirement of superiority has been the most fruitful area for dis-
claims are not ordinarily involved in other types of class actions." Opinion at 12-13
(footnote omitted).
102. Shields v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 448, 450 (D. Ariz. 1972); Rogers
v. Coburn Fin. Corp., 54 F.R.D. 417, 418 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Martin v. Family Publi-
cations Serv., Inc., 4 CCH CoNsumER CREDrr GuIm I 99,267 (D. Vt., June 20, 1970).
103. FED. R. Cirv. P. 23(b)(3). See note 27 supra.
104. Amendments to Rules of Civil Procedure, Advisory Committee's Note, 39
F.R.D. 69, 103 (1966). Rule 23(b)(3) specifies four matters pertinent to the determi-
nation of whether an action meets the superiority requirement for the maintenance of
a subdivision (b)(3) class action. The four factors listed in the rule were not, how-
ever, intended to be exclusive. 39 F.R.D. at 104; Wilcox v. Commerce Bank, Civil
No. 72-1494 (10th Cir., Feb. 20, 1973); Buford v. American Fin. Co., 333 F. Supp. -1243,
1250 (N.D. Ga. 1971); Shields v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 448, 450 (D. Ariz. 1972).
Three additional considerations have developed in rule 23 decisions. The first judi-
cially developed consideration is the importance of the incentive offered to maintain
actions where the individual claims are small or where an individual plaintiff has not
sustained damages sufficient to warrant an individual action. Green v. Wolf Corp., 406
F.2d 291, 301 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969); Eisen v. Carlisle
& Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 560 (2d Cir. 1968); Wilcox v. Commerce Bank, 55 F.R.D.
133, 136-37 (D. Kan. 1972), aff'd, Civil No. 72-1494 (10th Cir., Feb. 20, 1973);
Boggs v. Alto Trailer Sales Co., Inc., Civil No. 71-1271 (E.D. La., Aug. 7, 1972);
Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 485 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). The second judicially
developed consideration is the deterrent effect on possible defendants. Dolgow v. An-
derson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 487 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); Weinstein, Revision of Procedure: Prob-
lenis in Class Actions, 9 BUFFALO L. Rv. 433, 437 (1959). The third such consid-
eration is the need to keep the defendant from retaining the benefits of his illegal con-
duct. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 52 F.R.D. 253, 264 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
In determining the appropriateness of maintaining truth-in-lending suits as class ac-
tions, courts have discussed the considerations developed by judicial pronouncement
as well as those specified in the rule itself. Generally, these courts have observed that
the broad and open-ended terms of rule 23(b)(3) call for the exercise of consider-
able discretion on the part of the court. Wilcox v. Commerce Bank, 55 F.R.D. 134,
136 (D. Kan. 1972), aff'd, Civil No. 72-1494 (10th Cir., Feb. 20, 1973); Ratner v.
Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412, 416 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Kenney
v. Landis Financial Group, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 939, 952 (N.D. Iowa 1972). See also
Interpace Corp. v. City of Philadelphia, 438 F.2d 401 (3d Cir. 1971); Frankel, Some
Preliminary Observations Concerning Civil Rule 23, 43 F.R.D. 39 (1967).
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cussion in recent truth-in-lending decisions. 105 Courts have highlighted
the size of the class and the fact that borrowers represented in the class
would otherwise be barred by the statute of limitations as evidence of
the superiority of class action treatment.'0 6 At least one court has
noted that the existence of an administrative enforcement power does
not alone make a concurrent private civil action inferior for purposes of
rule 23(b) (3). l ° In addition, courts have discussed the difficulties
likely to be encountered in the management of a class action in deter-
mining whether the particular suit satisfies the requirement of superi-
ority.1 08
Nevertheless, the majority of the decisions considering the superi-
ority of the class action treatment of truth-in-lending suits have focused
their discussion on the problems created by the $100 minimum penalty
provision of the act.' As noted above, 110 the act creates a species of
private attorney general by providing for a bounty, in the form of the
minimum $100 recovery, to any "affected person" who discovers a vio-
lation of the act and successfully prosecutes an action against the credi-
tor. It is also clear that this minimum statutory amount is available to
such an affected person, whether or not that individual has suffered any
actual damages as a result of the violation.'' The question of major
concern to creditors, however, is whether a plaintiff can maintain a
class action to recover this minimum penalty on behalf of each mem-
ber of a purported class. In response to this question, one writer
expressed a belief that the statutory minimum penalty provision was
designed to "recompense consumers for the time and trouble of going
to court," and that Congress did not intend that this minimum penalty
be awarded to class members who were merely represented in court by
105. See cases cited in note 121 infra.
106. E.g., LaMar v. H & B Novelty & Loan Co., 55 F.R.D. 22, 25 (D. Ore. 1972).
107. Martin v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 4 CCH CONSUMER CREDIT GUIDE
99,267 (D. Vt., June 30, 1970).
108. Gerlach v. Allstate Ins. Co., 338 F. Supp. 642, 646 (S.D. Fla. 1972); Shields
v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 448, 450 (D. Ariz. 1972); Katz v. Carte Blanche Corp.,
53 F.R.D. 539, 541-43 (W.D. Pa. 1971). In Gerlach, a class action against a major
insurance company for alleged truth-in-lending violations, the court included among its
reasons for denying maintenance of a class action the fact that a contrary decision
would result in the creation of a class so large as to be unmanageable. 338 F. Supp. at
646. However, in the Katz case, the court held that a class of over 600,000 cardholders
was not unmanageable since feasible methods, including subclasses, were available for
the resolution of individual questions. 53 F.R.D. at 541-43.
109. See cases cited in footnote 121 infra.
110. See text accompanying notes 17-20 supra.
111. See Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270, 280
(S.D.N.Y. 1971).
[Vol. 24
others." 2  The writer thus concluded that in a consumer class action,
the minimum statutory penalty should be recoverable only by those
consumers who act as class representatives and those consumers-who
personally appear in the action." 3
Ratner and Superiority
The court in Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co." 4 was
the first to analyze specifically the question of the appropriateness of a
class action to recover on behalf of each member, the minimum statu-
tory amount provided in the act." 5 The defendant in the Ratner case
argued that the incentive of class action benefits was unnecessary be-
cause the act provides for the recovery of a minimum $100 penalty and
the payment of costs and reasonable attorney's fees, and that to allow
the recovery of the $100 statutory penalty for each class member would
result in a "horrendous, possibly annihilating punishment," unrelated
to any actual damages suffered by members of the purported class or
to any benefits realized by the defendant, for what was at most a "tech-
nical and debatable violation" of the act." 6 The court found the de-
fendant's arguments to be "cogent and persuasive" and concluded that
the certification of the Ratner action as a class action would have been
inconsistent with the specific remedy provided by Congress."17  Thus,
exercising "some considerable discretion of a pragmatic nature,""11 8 the
court held that the suit could not be maintained as a class action." 9
At least as important as the Ratner decision itself is the trend that
has subsequently developed. According to the Federal Reserve Board,
the clear trend since Ratner is away from allowing class actions to en-
force compliance with the act. 20 At least twenty-three district court de-
cisions have followed the Ratner logic in refusing to certify truth-in-
112. Dole, Private Enforcement of Consumer Credit Legislation, 26 Bus. LAw. 915,
918 (1971) (footnote omitted).
113. Id.
114. 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
115. Kriger v. European Health Spa, Inc., 56 F.R.D. 104, 106 (E.D. Wis. 1972);
Hausmann, Class Actions Under the Truth-in-Lending Act, 1 CLASS ACTION REP. 26,
30 (1972).
116. Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412, 416 (S.D.N.Y.
(1972).
117. Id. The court went on to state: "It is not fairly possible in the circumstances
of this case to find the (b) (3) form of class action 'superior to' this specifically 'avail-
able [method] for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy.'"
118. Id.
119. Id.
120. FRB 1972 REPORT, supra note 28, at 7.
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lending class actions. 121  The common thread found in this series of
decisions rejecting the superiority of class action treatment is the at-
tempt by a plaintiff to recover for each member of a purported class,
without proof of actual damages and for a violation of a new and tech-
nical statute, the minimum statutory amount provided in the act. 122
Having considered these factors, Judge Frankel decided that a class ac-
tion was not superior to the species of private attorney general created
by Congress.1 23  The reasoning of the Ratner decision obviously has
proven to be very persuasive to courts subsequently faced with the
problem of massive statutory liability for violations of the act. 124  This
effect is summarized in a decision of the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, in which the court explained that
while there were some earlier decisions to the contrary, since the
"thoughtful opinion" in Ratner, courts unanimously had held the class
action device to be inappropriate in truth-in-lending suits "where the
size of the potential class, coupled with the statutory minimum re-
121. Kroll v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 352 F. Supp. 357 (N.D. 111. 1972); Kenney v.
Landis Financial Group, Inc., 349 F. Supp. 939 (N.D. Iowa 1972); Gerlach v. All-
state Ins. Co., 338 F. Supp. 642 (S.D. Fla. 1972); Rodriguez v. Family Publications Serv.,
Inc., 57 F.R.D. 189 (C.D. Cal. 1972); Alsup v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 57 F.R.D. 89
(N.D. Cal. 1972); Mullen v. Montgomery Ward & Co., 57 F.R.D. 89 (N.D. Cal. 1972);
Goldman v. First Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 587 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Garza v. Chicago Health
Clubs, 56 F.R.D. 548 (N.D. I11. 1972); Shields v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 448 (D.
Ariz. 1972); Shields v. First Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 442 (D. Ariz. 1972); Kriger v. Euro-
pean Health Spa, Inc., 56 F.R.D 104 (E.D. Wis. 1972); Wilcox v. Commerce Bank, 55
F.R.D. 134 (D. Kan. 1972), a! 'd, Civil No. 72-1494 (10th Cir., Feb. 20, 1973); Rogers
v. Coburn Fin. Corp., 54 F.R.D. 417 (N.D. Ga. 1972); Hunter v. Gross Bros. Furniture,
Inc., Civil No. C-71-2443 RHS (N.D. Cal., Dec. 20, 1972); Johnson v. Austin Furniture,
Inc., Civil No. 72 C 724 (N.D. Ill., Oct. 11, 1972) (dictum); Haynes v. Logan Furniture
Mart, Inc., Civil No. 70 C 1827 (N.D. Ill., Sept. 20, 1972); Shields v. First Nat'l
Bank, Civil No. 71-686 Phx. WPC (D. Ariz., Aug. 15, 1972); Boggs v. Alto Trailer
Sales, Inc., Civil No. 71-271 (E.D. La., Aug. 7, 1972); Greer v. Sears, Roebuck & Co.,
Civil No. 72-80 CH (S.D.W. Va., July 3, 1972); Grubb v. Dollar Loan Co., Civil Nos.
15550, 15976 (N.D. Ga., May 25, 1972); Roesel v. Fulton Nat'l Bank, Civil No. 15376
(N.D. Ga., May 25, 1972); Berkman v. Sinclair Oil Corp., Civil Nos. 69 C 2055,
69 C 2320 (N.D. Ill., Mar. 8, 1973); Lindig v. City Nat'l Bank, Civil No. 72-79 (S.D.
Ohio, Mar. 14, 1973).
122. See, e.g., Kroll v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 352 F. Supp. 357, 360 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
In Berkman v. Sinclair Oil Corp., the court explained: "It is well settled that the class
action device is inappropriate in Truth in Lending cases where, as in the instant action,
the size of the potential class, coupled with the statutory minimum recovery of $100
would result in absurdly high or ruinous damages, wholly unrelated to the actual harm
caused by the violations." Civil Nos. 69 C 2055, 69 C 2320 (N.D. Ill., Mar. 8, 1973)
opinion at 11 (footnote omitted).
123. Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
124. See cases cited in note 121 supra.
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covery of $100 would have resulted in absurdly high and even ruinous
damages, wholly unrelated to the actual harm caused by the viola-
tions."'12 5
The only decision to date 12 to specifically reject the Ratner superi-
ority logic is Eovaldi v. First National Bank. 1 7  In that case, Judge
McMillen, who in two previous decisions had adopted the Ratner rea-
soning, 28 stated that he "reluctantly disagreed" with the conclusion in
Ratner that individual actions for the minimum statutory penalty and
attorney's fees were "fairer and more efficient [for] adjudicating these
controversies" or that the possibility of a "horrendous, possibly anni-
hilating punishment" was a valid consideration under rule 23(b)
(3) .12 Judge McMillen went on to expalin that his only concern was
"whether a class action is superior to multitudinous individual actions
from a standpoint of efficiency."'' 30 Then, equating the question of ef-
ficiency with that of the manageability of the class, he held a subdivi-
sion (b)(3) class action to be appropriate. 31 Nevertheless, Judge
McMillen expressed his concern over the disproportionate size of the
liquidated damages (as high as $17 million plus attorney's fees) as
compared to the actual damages (perhaps nonexistent). As a result,
although he expressed some doubt concerning the plaintiff's ability to
do so, Judge McMillen conditioned his certification on the amendment
of the plaintiffs complaint to sue only for actual damages and attorney's
fees.' 32 In the event that the plaintiff was unable to waive the multiple
minimum statutory amounts, 3 the parties were to brief the question
125. Garza v. Chicago Health Clubs, 56 F.R.D. 548, 548-49 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (foot-
notes omitted).
126. See Kroll v. Cities Serv. Oil Co., 352 F. Supp. 357, 360 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
127. Eovaldi v. First Nat'l Bank, 57 F.R.D. 545 (N.D. I1. 1972).
128. Haynes v. Logan Furniture Mart, Inc., Civil No. 70 C 1827 (N.D. Ill., Sept.
20, 1972); Johnson v. Austin Furniture, Inc., Civil No. 72 C 724 (N.D. Ill., Oct. 11,
1972) (dictum).
129. Eovaldi v. First Nat'l Bank, 57 F.R.D. 545, 547 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
130. Id.
131. Id. at 547-48.
132. Id. at 548.
133. See the Goldman discussion in note 88 supra. In Berkman v. Sinclair Oil
Corp., the court noted: "Plaintiffs in their Memorandum recognize that the punish-
ment they seek to impose upon defendants would be 'undesirable' and offer to reduce
the amount of recovery far below the statutory minimum. They propose that the
amount of recovery should be limited to double the monthly finance charges or $496,300
plus $100 for each of the three named plaintiffs. This Court in Goldman [Goldman v.
First Nat'l Bank, 56 F.R.D. 587 (N.D. fI1. 1972)] has previously held that such a
reduction of the statutorily imposed minimum civil penalty is an improper method for
preserving class actions under the Act. See also Kroll et al. v. Cities Service Oil
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of the constitutionality of the act's liquidated damage provision in a
class action context.' In this regard, the court expressed its belief
that the penalty provisions were punitive and unrelated to actual dam-
ages, and thus that these provisions could deprive the defendant of
property without due process. 135
In any event, it is clear that neither Ratner nor its progeny have
held class actions to enforce the civil remedy provisions of the act to be
per se improper. On the contrary, the Ratner decision specifically
left unanswered the appropriateness of the class action device in situa-
tions where the class of plaintiffs is made up of individuals who are
able to claim injury and prove actual damages.' 3 6 In fact, Judge Mc-
Millen conditionally certified a class action for the recovery of actual
damages, attorney's fees and costs, 1 31 despite the fact that the act does
not specifically provide for the recovery of actual damages. 3 ' Further-
more, because the Ratner decision resulted from the exercise of the
judicial discretion called for by subdivision (b)(3) of rule 23,139 it
is possible that on harsher facts than those found in Ratner, or in the
cases following the Ratner precedent, a judge might find the imposition
of greater liability to be appropriate.
Company [352 F. Supp. 357 (N.D. Ill. 1972)] where Judge Tone held that a similar
offer to reduce was inappropriate. Cf. Eovaldi, et al. v. The First National Bank of
Chicago [57 F.R.D. 545 (N.D. Ill. 1972)] where no decision as to reduction has yet
been reached." Civil Nos. 69 C 2055, 69 C 2320 (N.D. Ill., Mar. 8, 1973) opinion at
I In. 12.
134. Eovaldi v. First Nat'l Bank, 57 F.R.D. 545, 548 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
135. Id. Cf. United States v. Van de Carr, 343 F. Supp. 993, 1014-15 (C.D. Cal.
1972) (criminal action dismissed because of inconsistent administrative interpreta-
tions and the complex nature of Regulations T and U). The court in Berkman v.
Sinclair Oil Corp., provided some insight with respect to this due process argument:
"[Tihe substantial difficulty which would be encountered by the parties in proving
various members of the class use their cards primarily for business rather than for
personal use has already been demonstrated with regard to the named plaintiff, Adel-
man. The Act is primarily directed at consumer protection rather than business credit.
Defendants contend that they have the 'due process' right to require proof as to
whether the primary use of the credit card during the months in question was per-
sonal or business from each of its credit card holders. The necessity for such proof
makes this action entijely unmanageable. A shorter route of proof might well de-
prive defendants of 'due process' rights which under Rule 23(b)(3) is strictly pro-
hibited." Civil Nos. 69 C 2055, 69 C 2320 (N.D. Ill., Mar. 8, 1973) opinion at 13.
136. Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412, 416 n.7
(S.D.N.Y. 1972). See Wilcox v. Commerce Bank, Civil No. 72-1494 (10th Cir., Feb.
20, 1973).
137. Eovaldi v. First Nat'l Bank, 57 F.R.D. 545, 548 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
138. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1970).
139. See Wilcox v. Commerce Bank, Civil No. 72-1494 (10th Cir., Feb. 20,
1973).
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Therefore, despite Ratner and its progeny, and perhaps in light of
the Eovaldi decision, there is still a great deal of uncertainty concerning
the potential liability of creditors for violations of the act. As dis-
cussed earlier, massive statutory liability becomes a possibility when
the consumer class action is coupled with the statutory minimum pen-
alty feature of the act. Thus, if the purported class includes 5 million
consumers, as was the case in Mullen v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,140
the minimum aggregate of statutory penalties recoverable in a class ac-
tion could reach $500 million. One writer, who describes the minimum
penalty feature as the greatest practical problem presented by the at-
tempt to utilize the class action device to enforce the civil penalty provi-
sions of the act,14' explained that as important as the Truth-in-Lending
Act may be, "in a rational order of social priorities compliance with
truth-in-lending simply is not that important." '142 The writer concluded
that it is improbable that Congress could have contemplated the im-
position of such liability.143
While some may argue that this massive potential liability is im-
portant as a deterrent to truth-in-lending violations, 1 4 the possibility of
such liability may in fact reduce the effectiveness of the class action as
an enforcement device. 45  In this regard, a member of the Federal
Reserve Board explained that this potential massive statutory liability
could impede the use of the consumer class action as an effective de-
vice for the private enforcement of truth-in-lending. 4 6  It was the be-
lief of this board member that courts, which are given a great deal of
discretion in determining whether to certify class actions, 47 may be
inclined to deny certification merely because of the magnitude of po-
tential class action recoveries. 48 Moreover, soon after the effective
140. 57 F.R.D. 89 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
141. Dole, Private Enforcement of Consumer Credit Legislation, 26 Bus. LAw. 915,
918 (1971).
142. Id.
143. Id. See Berkman v. Sinclair Oil Corp., Civil Nos. 69 C 2055, 69 C 2320,
opinion at 17 (N.D. Ill., Mar. 8, 1973).
144. See, e.g., Wilcox v. Commerce Bank, 55 F.R.D. 134, 138 (D. Kan. 1972),
af 'd, Civil No. 72-1494 (10th Cir., Feb. 20, 1973).
145. FRB 1972 REPORT, supra note 28, at 13-14.
146. 118 CoNG. REc. 6913 (daily ed. Apr. 27, 1972) (letter from J. L. Robertson,
Vice Chairman of the Federal Reserve Board, to Senator William Proxmire) [hereinaf-
ter cited as Robertson letter].
147. Id. See Wilcox v. Commerce Bank, Civil No. 72-1494 (10th Cir., Feb. 20,
1973).
148. Robertson letter, supra note 146. The reason for Mr. Robertson's concern is
demonstrated by the following dictum in Goldman: "no court is likely to levy such a
crushing judgment on a defendant for a violation of a very new and technical statute."
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date of the act, it became evident that the truth-in-lending class action
device was being utilized in an attempt to obtain large recoveries from
"deep-pocket" corporations, rather than to enforce compliance by less
reputable creditors. 14 9  It is difficult to justify large recoveries from
such corporations when the agencies charged with administrative en-
forcement of the act have found the larger creditors to be in substantial
compliance with its requirements. 50 The massive potential liability
makes even less sense in light of the Federal Reserve Board's statement
in its most recent report to Congress that "in almost all cases where
violations are noted, they are found to be a result of inadvertent error
or misunderstanding."' '
A Legislative Limitation on Liability
Following the controversy generated by the Ratner decision on the
substantive disclosure issue 52 and the resulting potential $13 million
liability of the defendant bank, the Federal Reserve Board stated that
it might be desirable to establish a maximum liability, or otherwise re-
strict the scope of potential liability in a class action context, should
truth-in-lending suits be allowed to proceed as class actions. 53 In re-
sponse, a provision limiting class action liability was added to a bill
then being considered in the United States Senate.154 The provision
ultimately passed by the Senate shortly before the end of the second
session of the Ninety-Second Congress would have amended the act to
provide for the recovery of actual damages and of exemplary damages
subject to a minimum recovery of $100 in an individual action and a
maximum recovery of $100,000 in a class action, together with court-
determined costs and reasonable attorney's fees based on services per-
formed. 51 The act, if amended, would have required the court in as-
56 F.R.D. at 591-92. Mr. Robertson concluded that it was, therefore, important to
"suitably limit" the exposure of creditors in truth-in-lending class actions.
149. Hearings on H. 14931 Before the Subcomm. on Commerce and Finance of the
House Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., at 287 (1970).
150. See FRB 1972 REPORT, supra note 28, at 11; BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE
FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM, ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON TRUTH IN LENDING FOR
THE YEAR 1971 14 (1972) [hereinafter cited as FRB 1971 REPORT].
151. FRB 1972 REPORT, supra note 28, at 11.
152. Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y.
1971).
153. FRB 1971 REPORT, supra note 150, at 18.
154. S. 653, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., § 208 (1972).
155. The provisions passed by the United States Senate would have amended
section 1640(a) of the act to read:
"Except as otherwise provided in this section, any creditor who fails to comply with
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sessing exemplary damages to consider all relevant factors, including
the amount of any actual damages awarded, the frequency and persis-
tence of the creditor's failures to comply with the act, the resources of
the creditor, the number of persons adversely affected by the violation,
and whether the creditor's actions were intentional.'56
any requirement imposed under this chapter or chapter 4 of this title (other than section
161) with respect to any person is liable to such person in an amount equal to the sum
of-
"(1) any actual damages sustained by such person as a result of the failure;
"(2) such additional amount as the court may allow, except that the total awarded
shall (A) be not less than $100 in the case of an individual action, or (B) in the case
of a class action, not more than $100,000; and
"(3) in the case of any successful action to enforce the foregoing liability, the
costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney's fee which shall be the rea-
sonable value of the services rendered by the attorney without regard to the amount of
any recovery. In determining the amount of award in any class action, the court shall
consider, among other relevant factors, the amount of any actual damages awarded, the
frequency and persistence of failures of compliance by the creditor, the resources of
the creditor, the number of persons adversely affected, and the extent to which the
ceditor's failure of compliance was intentional." S. 652, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 208
(1972).
The Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs had the following
comments concerning this provision:
"The Committee gave careful consideration to the problem of a creditor's class ac-
tion liability under the Truth in Lending Act. Under section 130 of the Truth in Lend-
ing Act, a consumer can bring a civil action against creditors who fail to meet the law's
disclosure requirements and recover twice the amount of the finance charge, subject to
a minimum liability of $100 and a maximum liability of $1,000. As the Federal Re-
serve Board's 1971 Annual Report on the Truth in Lending Act pointed out, these pro-
visions of section 130 raise serious problems because of their possible applicability in
class actions. The $100 minimum liability provision could produce an enormous penalty
upon a creditor if applied to all the members of a class action suit filed in a Federal
court pursuant to Rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure ...
"The purpose of the civil penalties section of the Truth in Lending Act was to pro-
vide creditors with a meaningful incentive to comply with the law without relying upon
an extensive new bureaucracy. However, the Committee feels that this objective can
be achieved without subjecting creditors to enormous penalties for violations which do
not involve actual damages and may be of a technical nature.
"In reviewing the alternative solutions to the problem, the Committee considered a
proposal to exempt creditors from any class action liability unless actual damages could
be shown. The Committee rejected this alternative on the grounds that most Truth in
Lending violations do not involve actual damages and that some meaningful penalty
provisions are therefore needed to insure compliance. Accordingly, the Committee
decided to place an aggregate limitation on a creditor's class action liability for vio-
lations not involving actual damages." S. REP. No. 92-750, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 7-8
(1972).
156. S. 652, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 208 (1972). With respect to the provision for
exemplary damages, the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs ex-
plained:
"In assessing punitive damages, the courts are instructed to consider, among other
factors, the amount of any actual damages awarded, the frequency and persistence of
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This Senate approved amendment died in the House of Repre-
sentatives with the close of the Ninety-Second Congress. Nevertheless,
a bill proposing a similar amendment 5' was introduced recently by
Senator Proxmire of Wisconsin. The new Proxmire bill incorporates a
Federal Reserve Board recommendation that the greater of $50,000 or
one percent of the creditor's net worth be established as the upper
limit on the aggregate amount of possible recovery in truth-in-lending
class actions. 15 8 It is likely, however, that such an arbitrary maximum
on class action liability will, in fact, yield more problems than it avoids.
For example, it is easy to conjure up fact situations in which an arbi-
trary maximum on class action liability makes absolutely no sense at
all. Consider, for example, the application of a $100,000 maximum
liability provision to the class of 600,000 cardholders certified in Katz
v. Carte Blanche.' 59 Even assuming court approval of the highest
exemplary damages allowable under the Senate approved maximum li-
ability provision, the cost of distributing the award would far exceed
the less than seventeen cents to which each class member would be en-
titled. Furthermore, such an artificial maximum liability could en-
courage plaintiffs' counsel to seek certification of several smaller classes,
rather than one large class, in an attempt to recover multiple $100,000
exemplary damage awards; in turn, such an attempt could have the
anomalous result of requiring the defendant to argue for certification
of the largest possible consumer class. In any event, the court would
still be required in each such action to determine the appropriateness
of class action treatment in accordance with rule 23(c)(1) and to sat-
isfy the notice requirements set forth in rule 23(c)(2), an exercise
which is certain to result in a costly expenditure of judicial time and
effort.'6 ' Thus, while the proposed maximum on class action liability
the creditor's violations, the resources of the creditor, the number of persons adversely
affected, and the extent to which the violation was intentional.
"While the Committee expects the courts will award higher punitive damages to the
extent found appropriate after considering the pertinent factors, including those listed
above, a court does not have to find a violation was intentional in order to assess a
meaningful penalty upon a creditor to induce compliance with the legislation." S. Rep.
No. 92-750, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 9 (1972).
157. S. 914, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. § 208 (1972). Section 208 of S. 914 is very
similar to section 208 of S. 652 with the exception of the class action exemplary dam-
age provision, which reads: "in the case of a class action, such amount as the court may
allow, except that as to each member of the class no minimum recovery shall be appli-
cable, and the total recovery in such action shall not be more than the greater of $50,000
or 1 per centum of the net worth of the creditor."
158. FRB 1972 REPORT, supra note 28, at 14.
159. 53 F.R.D. 539, 540 (W.D. Pa. 1971).
160. For a good discussion of the difficulties of determining the class and pro-
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represents an attempt to rectify the uncertainties caused by the present
statutory language, it would provide only a partial solution. In fact,
there is little justification for the utilization of the class action device
to respond to truth-in-lending violations that result in no actual dam-
ages, whether or not an arbitrary maximum is established for potential
class action liability.
The objective of any such truth-in-lending exemplary damage pro-
vision has been identified by the Federal Reserve Board as the "en-
couragement [of] the voluntary compliance [with the act] which is
so necessary to insure nationwide adherence to uniform disclosure."'1 61
As previously discussed, voluntary compliance is encouraged by pro-
viding a sufficient incentive to sue element to make the statute self-en-
forcing.6 2 It is possible to provide this encouragement and the deter-
rent sought by the Federal Reserve Board without the harsh effects
that would result from the recovery by each member of a class of the
present minimum statutory penalty and without the problems that
would be created by the artificial limitations on class action liability
adopted by the Senate and recommended by the Federal Reserve
Board.
In this regard, the civil remedy provisions of the act 63 should be
amended to provide specifically for the recovery of actual damages re-
sulting from a violation, together with reasonable attorney's fees and
costs as determined by the court. The legislative history of this
amended provision could make it clear that both individual and repre-
sentative actions were contemplated for the recovery of such damages.
In addition, the act should provide that where a violation results in no
actual damages, a qualified plaintiff may bring an action for injunctive
or declaratory relief in any federal court on behalf of himself and
the United States. If such a plaintiff is successful in establishing a
violation of the act, technical or otherwise, he should be entitled to re-
cover court-determined attorney's fees and costs. In addition, the
court should be empowered to impose a civil penalty not to exceed an
amount established by Congress, of which a designated portion could
be awarded by the court to the successful plaintiff. More specifically,
viding notice to its members in an action where the size of the potential class is sub-
stantial, see Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, Civil Nos. 72-1521, 30934 (2d Cir., May 1,
1973).
161. FRB 1972 REPORT, supra note 28, at 13.
162. See text accompanying notes 4-24, supra.
163. 15 U.S.C. § 1640 (1970).
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such an amendment'14 might modify the remedy provisions of the act
to read in part:
(a) Except as otherwise provided in this section, any creditor
who fails to comply with any requirement imposed under this part
with respect to any person is liable to such person for any actual
damages sustained by that person as a result of the failure. Any
action under this subsection may be brought by such person in
any United States district court, or in any other court of competent
jurisdiction, within one year from the date of the occurrence of the
violation.
(b) Except as otherwise provided in this section, any obligor,
whether or not actually damaged, may bring a civil action pursuant
to Title 28, U.S.C. § 2201, in any United States district court for
a declaration that the course of conduct of the creditor of such
obligor has given rise to one or more violations of the requirements
imposed under this part with respect to such obligor, at least one of
which occurred within one year prior to the bringing of the action,
and for injunctive relief. The person bringing the action shall
describe in the complaint all such violations known to such person.
The action shall be brought and carried on by the person prosecut-
ing such action in the name of and for the United States, as well
as for such person. The person shall bring the action, and shall
give notice of the pendency thereof, in accordance with regulations
of the Board. In the event that more than one civil action shall be
instituted pursuant to this subsection involving the same course of
conduct, the court shall, upon motion by a defendant, stay further
proceedings with respect to the course of conduct in all but the
first action filed, to await final adjudication in the first action filed.
If the person bringing such action prevails in the action, the court
in its discretion may impose an appropriate civil penalty on the
creditor of not more than $50,000, of which amount up to $2,500
may be awarded to the person who first brought the action and
the balance, if any, shall be awarded to the United States. No such
civil penalty shall be awarded in any other action with respect to
the same course of conduct or violations of the creditor occurring
prior to the time at which the judgment imposing the penalty or
enjoining such conduct or violations becomes final. In deter-
164. The proposed amendment takes into consideration only subsections (a) and
(e) of the present section 1640. Amendments to present subsections (b) through (d)
are beyond the purview of this article.
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mining the amount of any penalty hereunder, the court shall con-
sider, among other relevant factors, the frequency and persistence
of failures of compliance by the creditor, the resources of the
creditor, the number of persons adversely affected, and the ex-
tent to which the creditor's failure of compliance was intentional.
(c) In the case of any successful action to enforce the lia-
bility under subsection (a) or to obtain declaratory or injunctive
relief under subsection (b), the court may award to the person
bringing the action the costs of the action, together with a reason-
able attorney's fee, which shall be the reasonable value of the ser-
vices rendered by the attorney without regard to the amount of
any recovery or penalty.
Such an amendment would clarify, in subsection (a), the right to
recover under the act's civil remedy provisions actual damages result-
ing from a truth-in-lending violation, together with attorney's fees and
costs. As provided in subsection (c), the attorney's fees would be
based on the reasonable value of services rendered by the attorney
and would not be governed by the amount of actual damages awarded.
In addition, in adopting the broader language recently proposed by the
Federal Reserve Board, 65 the right to recover damages under subsec-
tion (a) would not be limited to damages resulting from disclosure
violations, but would expressly extend to the recovery of actual dam-
ages resulting from the failure to comply with any requirement imposed
under part B of the act. 16 6 As is the case with the existing act, sub-
section (a) would permit an action for actual damages to be brought
in any United States district court, or in any other court of competent
jurisdiction, within one year from the date of the occurrence of the
violation.16 7
Proposed subsection (b) would permit any "affected person,"'168
whether or not actually damaged, 6 9 to bring an action in any United
165. FRB 1972 REPORT, supra note 28, app. D, at 1.
166. Section 1640(a) presently provides that any creditor who 'fails . . . to dis-
close . . . any information required under this part to be disclosed . . . is liable."
Because this language may be interpreted as limiting the liability of creditors to disclose
violations, the Federal Reserve Board has recommended that section 1640(a) be amended
to specifically apply to the failure "to comply with any requirement imposed." FRB
1972 REPORT, supra note 28, app. D, at 1.
167. 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e) (1970).
168. See note 17 supra.
169. In keeping with the concept of encouraging private enforcement, the person
bringing the action need not be damaged. See Ratner v. Chemical Bank New York
Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270, 280-81 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
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States district court'70 for a declaration' 7 ' that the course of conduct of
a creditor gave rise to one or more violations of the act and to enjoin
such conduct. 1 72  The action would be brought qui tam,17 3 in the name
of and for the United States as well as the person bringing the action;
this requirement accords with the nature of a qui tam action, limits
the number of actions that may be brought for a violation, and avoids
problems of establishing the individual entitled to a possible share of
the penalty. In order to ensure a measure of governmental control
over such litigation and to discourage the splitting of actions by a plain-
tiff, the plaintiff would be required to describe all violations of the
creditor known to the plaintiff and to bring the action, and provide
notice of its pendency, in accordance with regulations of the Federal
Reserve Board. The resort to board regulations, rather than statutory
guidelines, is intended to provide a degree of flexibility in meeting
problems, unforeseen at present, that may arise in connection with the
use of the qui tam action. While no sanctions are expressly provided
in the event a plaintiff does attempt to split actions, this fact would
presumably be considered by the court, together with the nonexclusive
criteria expressly provided in the subsection, in determining the amount
of any penalty to be imposed and any reward to be awarded.
If the plaintiff can successfully establish a violation of the act,
technical or otherwise, the court would be authorized to award rea-
sonable attorney's fees, as well as the costs of the action. Again, as
170. Section 2201 creates a remedy in "any court of the United States." Subsection
(b) further restricts the remedy to district courts.
171. 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970). Section 2201 provides: "In a case of actual con-
troversy within its jurisdiction, except with respect to Federal taxes, any court of the
United States, upon the filing of an appropriate pleading, may declare the rights and
other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration, whether or not fur-
ther relief is or could be sought. Any such declaration shall have the force and effect of
a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such."
172. See 28 U.S.C. § 2202 (1970). Section 2202 provides: "Further necessary or
proper relief based on a declaratory judgment or decree may be granted, after reason-
able notice and hearing against any adverse party whose rights have been determined by
such judgment."
173. An accepted abbreviation for the phrase "qui tam pro domino rege quam pro
seipso" (literal translation: "he who as much for the king as for himself"), qui tam is
an action developed in English law to encourage private enforcement of public laws. See
generally, Note, The History and Development of Qui Tam, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 81, 83
(1972). It was used previously in the United States to encourage private enforcement of
federal statutes. See 31 U.S.C. § 232 (1970); 46 U.S.C. § 1351 (1970). In recent
years there has been a resurrection of qui tam action. See generally, Note, The History
and Development of Qui Tam, 1972 WASH. U.L.Q. 81 (1972); Note, Qui Tam Suits
Under the Federal False Claims Act: Tool of the Private Litigant in Public Actions, 67
Nw. U.L. REV. 446 (1972).
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provided in subsection (c), the attorney's fees awarded would be
based on the reasonable value of services rendered and would not be
governed by the amount of any penalty imposed on the creditor. In
addition, the court would be empowered to impose a civil penalty not
to exceed $50,000 (or such other amount as may be established by
Congress) of which up to $2,500 could be awarded by the court to the
successful plaintiff. The remainder of the civil penalty, if any, would
be paid in accordance with the directives of Congress, perhaps to the
Federal Reserve Board and other designated agencies to further ad-
ministrative enforcement of the act.1 7 4  In determining the amount of
the civil penalty, the court would be directed by Congress to consider
the same criteria specified by the Senate in its "amended" version of
the act175 and recommended by the Federal Reserve Board in its recent
report to Congress .17 The $2,500 limit on the reward recognizes the
fact that the plaintiff need not have suffered any actual damages 77 and
that $100, together with attorney's fees and costs, 178 was heretofore
considered sufficient to induce a person to act as a private attorney
general. 7 9
This provision, or one similar to it, would retain the purpose of
encouraging private enforcement of truth-in-lending, while providing
a penalty for violations of the act that more fairly reflects the nature of
possible offenses. At the same time, it would limit the need to provide
class actions as procedural vehicles to be misused by private attorneys
general.
Conclusion
The present civil remedy provisions serve neither the consumers
intended to be aided by the Truth-in-Lending Act nor the creditors in-
tended to be subject to its controls. While the modifications adopted
by the Senate and recommended by the Federal Reserve Board would
provide a partial solution to the shortcomings of the present statutory
provisions, they fail to recognize the distinction between inducements
174. See 15 U.S.C. § 1607 (1970).
175. S. 652, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. § 208 (1972).
176. FRB 1972 REPORT, supra note 28, app. D, at 1.
177. A person who has suffered damages may sue for damages under subsection
(a) as well as for a reward under subsection (b).
178. The lure of large attorney's fees was undoubtedly a factor in the filing of
certain truth-in-lending class actions. In any event, the ability to recover attorney's fees
and costs is a valid inducement to private enforcement. This inducement is retained
in proposed subsection (c).
179. See 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a)(1) (1970).
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intended to compensate, and inducements intended to deter violations of
law. More specifically, the distinction must be made between truth-in-
lending violations that result in actual damages and violations that do
not result in such damages. Where actual damages arise, the civil
remedy provisions of the act should serve a reparative function. How-
ever, where actual damages are not present, the remedial function of
the civil remedy provisions should predominate. While the class action
is a legitimate procedural device for the recovery of damages suffered
by a properly certified class, the class action vehicle is inappropriate
when used by a private attorney general in a nonactual damage situa-
tion; the absence of actual damages eliminates the need for a repre-
sentative party to effect a "recovery" on behalf of a class of persons
who, by definition, can establish no loss. It is recommended, there-
fore, that the class action device be statutorily limited to the recovery of
actual damages and that a new technique-the qui tam action-be
utilized to encourage the private attorney general to prominently partic-
ipate in the enforcement of truth-in-lending.
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